THEOLOGY

VOL. LIV MARCH, 1951 No. 369

Editorial

WE now have before us the report of the Broadcasting Committee, presided over by Lord Beveridge, as well as *Christianity and Broadcasting*, the report of a Commission appointed by the British Council of Churches (S.C.M. Press, 2s. 6d.). Broadcasting is a much less inflammable and controversial subject than gambling, not because it is intrinsically and inevitably a good thing, but because in this country it is by general consent being conducted and developed on the most satisfactory lines that are possible. We are referring here to sound broadcasting and not to television, which will require separate consideration and is not dealt with in the B.C.C. report. The Beveridge Committee has proposed a handsome vote of confidence in the British Broadcasting Corporation which it seems to us is well deserved, and its proposals for future improvement are of a subordinate kind. The most important of these is designed to provide for more regional devolution. Since nearly everyone agrees that British broadcasting should continue to be an independent monopoly, and should neither become a State-controlled system nor be handed over to competitive commercialism, it is necessary by all possible means to guard against the dangers to which a monopoly is exposed. The provision of more responsibility for initiative and variety at the regional level should prove an effective means of doing this.

Christians as such have no special competence to offer advice, still less to lay down the law, on the many purely technical questions which occupied the attention of the Beveridge Committee. On the other hand, *Christianity and Broadcasting* rightly emphasizes the fact that their interest is not, or ought not to be, restricted to what is called "religious broadcasting". "We believe that Christianity commits us to a concern for the whole of society and not merely to seeking the welfare of the Church as an institution" (p. 11). In view of the "crisis of culture" and the immense influence of broadcasting, which is educational in the broadest sense, Christians cannot but be concerned that it should be used to deepen the nation's awareness of the challenges that are being made to its traditional way of life and inherited values (liberal as well as Christian) and to make clear the need for decision in the sphere of ultimate faith.

This does not mean, however, that Christians should concentrate their efforts on getting the B.B.C. to be an organ of Christian propaganda. Even if such a doctrinal monopoly were desirable, the social situation in Britain would not warrant its being claimed nor could it reasonably be granted. What, however, is needed now is not streamlined propaganda, but freedom to articulate clearly the conflicting assumptions and beliefs that are actually held, so that there

may be a sharpened sense of the choices that have got to be made. This freedom ought certainly to include freedom to express Christian convictions as plainly and as strongly as possible, but Christians have learned now that they must stand for toleration, which means that they will desire and welcome the expression on equal terms of convictions which they regard as erroneous. The distinction that is drawn in *Christianity and Broadcasting* (pp. 13 f.) between toleration and indifferentism is of the utmost importance not only for broadcasting but for broadcasting particularly. It is a healthy sign that the Churches did not wait for the recommendations of the Beveridge Committee in order to press for the kind of controversy about fundamentals which is the best way of attacking the canker of indifferentism.

* * * * *

A reply to the article on "Should a Christian be a Freemason?", which appeared in the January number, will be published next month.

Linguistic Philosophy and Dogmatic Theology

How shall we proceed if we wish to embark upon the study of "religious language", of religious logical frameworks?

There are two severe disadvantages under which, in the eyes of his co-religionists, a linguistic philosopher who attempts to apply linguistic methods to religious material is bound to suffer. The first is that "pure" linguistic philosophy is itself not as yet sufficiently developed for him to have at his disposal the particular techniques which he needs. He is like an engineer in a production drive, who must first design the jig which will then produce the precision tool which will then, if everything turns out well, do the actual job—of which the directors of the firm have promised completion by the end of next week. The second disadvantage is that by its very nature linguistic philosophy proceeds piecemeal. Reproaches made against it are that it produces correlations and results which are only provisional: which are not yet sufficiently tested: which only apply to a part of the field: which do not answer the question which the religious inquirer wants answered: and so on. Religiously speaking, by the side of the old-style "direct" philosopher, the linguistic philosopher as yet cuts a very poor figure indeed.

In spite of this fact, however, the linguistic philosopher is being constantly pressed, by religious and non-religious people alike, to "come out of his shell and give a lead". Professor Price has called upon him, in a rousing sermon, to take his proper place as an intellectual and moral force (H. H. Price, *Clarity is Not Enough*, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1945); Dr Jeffery has called upon him to remake the universities (George B. Jeffery, *The Unity of Knowledge, Reflections on the Universities of Cambridge and London*, 1950, pp. 55 f., 68). Unesco (it is rumoured) desires him, and that forthwith, to save the entire culture of the whole Western world. If, in addition to being a philosopher, he happens

himself to have a religious vocation, the pressure becomes not less, but even greater. "The entire future of Anglo-American civilization", said a famous scientist to a Christian linguistic philosopher recently, "depends on the emergence of a group of people, however small, who will combine within themselves the full scientific with the full religious tradition."

In this predicament the linguistic philosopher, like the engineer, can do either or both of two things. He can get on with the designs for the blueprints of his jig—that is, do the only thing which will actually enable him, in the end, to see the job through. Or he can take time off to go and argue with the directors; he can explain to them the difficulties, and forecast the probable progress of the whole process of production, knowing quite well that his own preliminary designs may not be right. In so far as he does this he is not, strictly speaking, following his profession as an engineer. He is producing, on the basis of his experience as an engineer, an informed guess.

The two concluding articles of this series—this one and the next—consist of a series of just such informed guesses. Doubtless these and comparable guesses are being made, by myself and others, in the light of a certain amount of linguistic philosophical experience. Nevertheless, it cannot be too much emphasized that the preliminary designs may not be right, and that the activities to which, at this stage, we should be exclusively devoting ourselves are those which will promote the development of "pure" linguistic philosophy; those which can alone produce the jigs which can alone produce the precision tools which will perhaps, in the end, do the job. Only the necessity, under pressure, to defend personal sincerity—to attempt, that is, to reply to the reiterated and quite legitimate question, "How *can* you do this sort of thing and yet be a Christian?"—has provoked the surveys given in these two articles; which are presented strictly at the speculative reader's own risk.

Linguistic philosophy presupposes the validity of science; it therefore in its naïve state also presupposes a materialistic and atheistic universe. That is its point of start. It has, quite recently, found its own religious prophet in the Jewish philosopher and contemplative Simone Weil, who says, in her altogether outstanding book *La Pesanteur et la Grâce* (Librairie Plon, 1948): ". . . atheism is a purification. I ought to be an atheist with that part of myself which is not made for God. Among men with whom the supernatural part of themselves has not been awakened, the atheists are right and the believers wrong . . ." (quoted from Jarrett-Kerr's article in *The Frontier,* January 1951). To be a contemplative in such circumstances is easier than to be a philosopher. The contemplative can wait upon the God whom she will not acknowledge, and die for the Church which she will not enter. The philosopher must think things out, all round.

It is not very difficult to show, to start with, that the materialistic and atheistic presuppositions which are unthinkingly held by most scientists will not do. It is clearly not the case, once one reflects

upon the question (to quote again the scientist already mentioned, who alleged that biologists in overwhelming numbers hold this view) that "man is made of matter and matter is made of billiard-balls". It is also possible to show, fairly easily, that such a crude attack upon religious and metaphysical statements as that made by Professor Ayer in *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936) will not do. For Ayer's criteria for having meaning, as given there, are so iconoclastic, so sweepingly privative, that they exclude as "nonsense" not only all religious and metaphysical statements, but also all the key-propositions of pure science—Schrödinger's wave-equations, for instance—and also all the propositions of *Language, Truth and Logic* itself. What Ayer does not see, in his protest against the use of "nonsensical" statements, is that the conceptions of "sense" and "nonsense" themselves cannot be used with unlimited generality—in the vague, as it were. They must always have reference to some particular system; a nonsense-statement being one which does not conform to the rules of that particular system, and a sensible statement one which does. Thus it is the whole system, not the isolated statement, which needs to "have meaning", i.e. to be verifiable in experience. In *Language, Truth and Logic* Ayer makes the quite unjustified assumption that the grammatical system of English, when added on to the Frege-Russell logic, together yield a logically homogeneous "system" or "language" called "correct English", and that this is the only medium within which, for Englishmen, genuine thinking can occur. This whole assumption is totally untrue. The ordinary English language, even when correct, is not a homogeneous logical medium. Its words and sentences are like a pile of tiddlywinks, of many colours, which have fallen out of their boxes into the bottom of the drawer in which the family games are kept. Nobody in the family knows what games the counters came from; nobody knows what games they could be used for. Only two things about them are clear—namely, first, that they are, and will remain, different colours (noun-tiddlywinks, verb-tiddlywinks, and so on[1]), and, secondly, that there is an indefinite number of intellectual and logical games which could be played with them. The family, for instance, may be at this moment delightedly using them for a sort of game which has never been played before. Ayer tried to allow only one game, Frege-Russell tiddlywinks—which, anyway, is played with different counters, and so which probably does not count as tiddlywinks at all.

All this sort of thing can be shown. It can be shown also that such a philosopher as Ryle (*The Concept of Mind*, 1950) is being merely escapist in so far as he tries to eliminate the "ghost", or "mind", from the human organic "machine". For it is fairly easy to show that once one tends, in any dialect, any language, any symbolism, and above all in the ordinary language of common sense, to think of a man as a kind of behaviouristic machine, the machine in question

[1] Actually, in "ordinary English", the tiddlywinks can change colour to an alarming extent; but in highly inflected languages, like Latin, their colours remain the same.

will always, in the end, tend to get a mental or spiritual "ghost" in it. For man is such a very, very queer kind of machine that any machine-analogy which is used for describing him will need also to contain within itself the logico-grammatical multiplicity to become "queer", which means that in practice, and even in the biological sciences, "ghosts" (consisting of minds, purposes, wills, goals, and even queerer entities such as "functional causes") get into the behaviouristic or mechanistic metaphor, construct it how you will. Ryle's basic plea, indeed, in *The Concept of Mind*—which, however, runs counter to the superficial interpretation which can be put upon the book—is that thinkers should abandon equally ghost and machine, and launch out linguistically in order to take the hazardous leap to the hypothesis that man is man (p. 328). What Ryle does not see, in his reverence for ordinary language, is that ordinary language will not get them there. On the contrary, ordinary language is saturated with ethereal ghosts, spirits, and souls, operating behaviouristic structures, models, and machines.

All these, and other current and (so-called) "irreligious" presuppositions, can be refuted or shown to be in need of amendment. They are being refuted and amended, over and over again, by linguistic philosophers; including, among these, the later Ayer. But it cannot be too much emphasized that when all this has been done, nothing whatever has been said which tends to show either that Christian or any other religious presuppositions are true, or that Christian or any other religious practices are desirable. Most scientists think that religious presuppositions are untrue, and obviously so; most sociologists think that many religious practices, though perhaps so deeply rooted as to be ineradicable, are morally detestable and culturally disastrous. Confronted with these opinions, which—unlike the old-style "direct" philosopher—he must take seriously, since they come with a considerable amount of authority, what is the linguistic philosopher who is also religious to say? It is only with the consideration of these and similar questions that linguistic religious philosophy proper begins.

Now, inevitably, in this sort of situation, every religious philosophic thinker must decide for himself what intellectual enterprises he will undertake, and upon what presuppositions these shall rest. Once he has made this decision, however, a considerable measure of agreement can be secured as to what techniques should be applied.

The following is the present writer's list of enterprises that should be given priority:

1. A thorough re-examination should be undertaken of the whole question to what extent theological and metaphysical forms of thinking resemble scientific forms of thinking, and to what extent they do not.

Consideration of this problem already preoccupies a whole group of philosophers of science who have recently founded *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. (See especially, in this, Philip Frank, *Metaphysical Interpretations of Science*, Nos. 1 and 2.) It also

preoccupies several philosophers of religion and metaphysicians (see especially D. M. Emmet, *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*, 1945, and her forthcoming lectures on *Religious Language*, and Winston H. F. Barnes, *The Philosophical Predicament*, 1950); though none of these approaches seems to me to have carried the matter far enough.

Two probable conclusions, however, already emerge from the considerable amount of thinking that is going on. The first is that metaphysical thinking, far from being "nonsense", is far more like scientific thinking than either Comte and the original Positivists, or Mach and Schlick and Carnap and the Vienna Circle, supposed. This conclusion has pressed itself increasingly on philosophic attention as philosophers' conceptions of science became more sophisticated. While science was thought of as, quite obviously, "organized common sense", the analogies between scientific thinking and metaphysical thinking naturally became obscured. But now that it is clear that, to quote Norman Campbell, "science is *not* 'organized common sense'; it is the most esoteric of all studies" (*Principles of Electricity*, Peoples' Books, undated, p. 29), generic resemblances have begun to emerge on all sides.

The second probable conclusion is that teleological thinking (forms of thinking, that is, which are couched in terms of purpose or design) is going to turn out to be linguistically and scientifically fundamental; not something to be analysed away, as has been supposed. (See, on this, R. B. Braithwaite, *Moral Principles and Inductive Policies*, British Academy Lecture, 1950). What has retarded until now the development of teleological thinking, as an instrument for scientific prediction, is that the requisite branches of non-metrical mathematics have not been developed as yet (see, however, Von Neumann and Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour*, 1944). On the whole, scientists who need to think in terms of purposes or goals (see, for instance, E. S. Russell, *The Directiveness of Organic Activity*, 1945) have still to couch their thinking in ordinary language, in which the requisite degree of precision cannot be obtained, and in which there are no novel or powerful theorems which can be applied.

Now, it is known to dogmatic theologians, but not to ordinary Christians, and apparently also not to linguistic philosophers,[1] that the Christian Trinitarian conception of deity is not, in Comte's sense of the words, "theological" (primitive, that is, and personalized) but "metaphysical" (couched, that is, in terms of abstract First Causes, and underlying general principles, and so on). Thus the starting-point of Christian dogmatic theology (if, that is, there is so small a gap to bridge as is now beginning to be thought between metaphysics and deductive science) should not be "God exists", any more than the starting-point of theoretical physics should be

[1] See, for instance, John Wisdom, "Gods" in *Logic and Language*, ed. by A. G. N. Flew, 1950; and the whole series of articles in *Mind* which originated from J. Findlay's article in *Mind*, October 1948: "Can the Existence of God be Disproved?"

"Schrödinger's Ψ-function exists", but "God is to be conceived of as Trinity in Unity", and therefore, by implication, not as e.g. Duality in Unity. This is a key proposition which may or may not be justifiable, but which is quite clearly not nonsensical. It is not to be judged in isolation, but with reference to the empirical consequences which can or cannot be drawn from it, to the correlations which can or cannot be made between the presuppositions of various religions with its help,[1] and so on. Or again, the Christian Trinity may be conceived of as a scientific "model", "dressing up" some intuitively perceived but rather fundamental theory, whose nature we do not know. At present Christian thinkers who are ignorant of the philosophy of science are handling the whole problem of theism in a wrong way; trying to create an isolated subject, operating in a vacuum, called "theology", or "the study of creatureliness", or some such thing, instead of handling dogmatic theological foundational research, and scientific foundational research, as two parts of the same study. There is quite good reason, I think, that—to use Comte's terminology again—philosophers of science could, in the long run, help religious thought to pass from the "metaphysical" stage to the "scientific", if theologians could help it to pass more securely from the "theological" stage to the "metaphysical".

2. A program of Foundational Research should be undertaken into the possibility of constructing a comparative grammar based not upon the Latin language, but upon symbolic logical principles; and an attempt should then be made to see whether these could provide a new logical framework for theology.

The presupposition behind this enterprise is that the whole structure of grammar as founded on the European languages—and therefore the whole Aristotle-Frege-Russell system of symbolic logic which "corresponds" to this, founded as it is on the subject-predicate construction—is not either logically or grammatically "primitive", or fundamental. [For an alternative presentation of this thesis see Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Grammatical Categories* (*Language*, XXI, 1945), and *Languages and Logic* (*The Language of Wisdom and Folly*, edited by Irving J. Lee, 1949).] To look for a "primitive" grammatico-logical system, we must both study languages which have no formally differentiated parts of speech, such as certain American Indian languages, and Classical Chinese,[2] and we must further find or invent a logical system "corresponding" to them, in the same rather rough-and-ready way as that in which the subject-predicate founded logic of Aristotle, developed but not basically changed by Russell, "corresponds" to the structure of Indo-European languages. The suggestion has been put forward that this might be achieved by making a linguistic interpretation of some form of Pure Combin-

[1] A startling possibility has recently emerged, based upon the Mahayana Buddhist texts translated and edited by Evans-Wenz, and upon the Tibetan writings quoted by David-Néel, of correlating, in a comparatively precise manner, Mahayana Buddhist and Christian Trinitarian thinking.

[2] To say this is to assume, for philosophical purposes, that the linguistic controversy is settled as to whether Classical Chinese has, or has not, in the European sense of the words, "parts of speech".

atory Logic (the system which has been developed by the American logicians H. B. Currie and Alonzo Church) to give the basic logical structure (i) of natural languages which have no formally differentiated parts of speech, and (ii) of such figures of speech as metaphor and simile in inflected languages.[1]

The object of this second enterprise, as contrasted with the first, is to try to throw some light upon the nature and use of religious statements when they are *not* used metaphysically; when they are used, for instance, in prayers and invocations, i.e. in "ordinary language". If, in our search for the nature of religious framework, enterprise 1 is pursued without enterprise 2, we shall inevitably become tempted to think that religious metaphysical systems are merely inadequate and impoverished scientific ones; without realizing that, owing to the fact that they are founded upon such linguistic phenomena as ritual and myth, they have a logical multiplicity, richness, and strength, all their own, the operational possibilities inherent in which it is imperative (if we would estimate the sense in which such statements can be true or false) to find out.

Thus we must first initiate and then pursue a new logico-linguistic activity: the Philosophy of the Parts of Speech. And the reason why we must do this is to develop our findings in the light of the fundamental intuition of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (described in the second article in this series)—namely, that, in any logic or language founded upon the Frege-Russell logic, there will will be "shown" another, "inexpressible", logic or "language"—that fundamental logic both of "facts", and of "logical pictures", and of "emphasis"—which is mirrored in ideographic scripts and in metaphor and simile, in which there are no "logical constants" as we understand them, and the elements in which are combined like links in a chain. In strictly isolating languages (so our presupposition runs) this fundamental logic is the logic which is explicit; in such languages it is the subject-predicate construction, and all that goes with it, which must be "shown", and cannot be "said". And it is this fundamental logic, not the subject-predicate, which "corresponds" to the structural foundations of theology.

Thus the general point of view from which we must work, in such an enterprise, can be stated by saying that any logical or grammatical rule without exception, in any language, has not only a positive function, which is that of facilitating precise statement, but also a negative function, which is privative. By virtue of this negative function it imposes linguistic limitations; it excludes altogether, that is, certain formal possibilities of thinking in order to facilitate the development of others. A language the words of which are classifiable into parts of speech, for instance, cannot perform the highly intricate and interesting linguistic operations normal to a language

[1] There is an article extant by the present author which analyses into a Pure Combinatory notation (i.e. translates into Classical Chinese, as it were) the theological statement: "It is extraordinary that in this mystery, Christ should be at once the Victim and the Sacrificer; the Worshipped and the Worshipper; the Offering and the Priest."

the words of which are not so divided, and vice versa; linguistically, one cannot have it both ways. On the other hand, one needs to have it both ways; for the complexity of the real world has direct or indirect effects upon us all. Sooner or later, in order to try to describe some part of it the impress of which has been insufficient upon our native language (probably because our native language was committed to the exploration of alternative descriptive possibilities), we desire to make use of those grammatical and logical possibilities of which our native language has deprived us. Then we take to metaphor, to paradox, to "nonsense". This happens, noticeably, in poetry, in the biological and social sciences, and in Christian theology. It happens also, though in a different way, in Zen Buddhism. Our thesis then is (the thesis, that is, which prompts us to our second enterprise) that dogmatic theology should no longer confine itself to expressing its fundamental truths in metaphor, in paradox, in "nonsense". It should launch out, and create for itself a symbolism which contains, instead of being deprived of, the grammatico-logical possibilities which it needs.

The above two enterprises are "foundational" for Dogmatic Theology. The other two upon the list are foundational for Ascetic Theology, and will form the subject-matter of a final article.

MARGARET MASTERMAN.

American Letter: No. 9

MODERN SECTS IN THE AMERICAN WEST

ALMOST always heresy is an inevitable reaction to the inadequate teaching of the faith. Often the new-born sect is a revolt against the "sins, negligences, and ignorances", of the Church's leaders and laity. Bishop Gore habitually counterbalanced his criticisms of divisive Protestantism with the confession that in every modern sect he saw the image of some sin of Mother Church.

But generalizations of that sort, true enough in the past, must be modified and sometimes abandoned in any study of sectarianism in the young Western world of our day. A Bible, accidentally dropped in a pagan community, may give birth to "a new faith". Christ the Lord may be revealed to some startled spiritually hungry soul whose conversion drives him to the founding of a *Full Gospel Church*. He has seen domes and spires topped with crosses, and may have wondered what goes on beneath them! Yet only now, with the Scriptures before him, has he realized at once the nature of sin and man's need of redemption. He is not in revolt against historic Christianity. Indeed, it is only after the creation of his little sect that he wanders experimentally into "orthodox" places of worship. He finds them wanting simply because they do not fit the pattern laid down in the Bible as he has read it. Without an awareness either of history or traditional theology he "makes his own". Later, when the disgruntled members of other and older faiths come to his tent, Catholicism and Protestantism alike become anathema. They are not in *his* scrip-

tures. Satan has closed their eyes to the prophetic vision in which the "flying saucers" are no less than Ezekiel's mystic wheel coming again as the sign of the impending judgment.[1]

To be sure, such sects are sporadic and short-lived. The inventor wears out his welcome, and members drop back into unbelief or fall captive to the entrancing apocalyptic groups which skilfully make capital of our contemporary chaos with the dread threat of world destruction as the inescapable fulfilment of prophecy. Here, of course, the *Book of Daniel* and the *Apocalypse* are interwoven in the most frightening fashion with the apocalyptic passages in the Gospels. Englishmen have seen ample illustrations of that in their experiences with *Jehovah's Witnesses*, if not with the *Seventh Day Adventists*, who now have active missionaries in every country of the old world. While it is true that the *Seventh Day Adventists* came into existence as long since as 1845, and in protest against the Christian Sunday as a papal innovation, the great strength of their appeal to the multitude unquestionably rises out of the extraordinary parallel between Old and New Testament prophecy and apocalyptic and the course of current events—considered, of course, from a rigid fundamentalist standpoint. The usual manipulation of dates and of isolated texts is apparent. "Babylon" in the Apocalypse is modern Rome: 666, the number of the Beast, is Stalin.

Though most of these sects draw their following from the semi-literate (very many of the converts coming from pure American paganism, but not a few from Rome and the older Protestantism), it may not be assumed that the *Adventists* as a whole have an illiterate laity and an unscholarly leadership. Some of the contributors to their widely circulated magazine *The Voice of Prophecy* are competent Hebraists who would have been at home with Dr Pusey, though they anathematize Driver and all of the modern critics; and New Testament Greek scholars are common in their seminaries. In fact, one of our own leading professors of New Testament language and literature came to us full-fledged from one of their colleges. Certainly their great strength lies in the fact that every one of them is a devoted evangelist whose secular skills are dedicated to the advancement of the cause. For instance, "the church" has a great college of medicine close to Los Angeles, as well as many hospitals. The hospitals are beautifully administered, and the medical college is recognized as one of the best. Significantly it is named *The College of Medical Evangelism*. Its graduates, practising medicine in the name of Christ, do not lose opportunities to proclaim their "gospel" to the patients in their care. Where they lose, I think, is in their rigid Old Testament ethic linked with an iron discipline over their members before which the mailed hand of Rome seems to be but a velvet glove.

Nevertheless *Seventh Day Adventist* propaganda concerning the Sabbath is highly skilled. In sustaining their devotion to Saturday they make a great show of support from the post-Nicene fathers by

[1] This new sect, its preacher drawing great crowds, has recently appeared in Napa, California. There are many such.

quoting them out of context in exposition of "Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy." Similarly they appeal to anti-papal prejudices by quoting Latin authorities in context. For example, "Cardinal Gibbons says this: 'You may read the Bible from Genesis to Revelation, and you will not find a single line authorizing the sanctification of Sunday. The Scriptures enforce the religious observance of Saturday, a day which we never sanctify.' "[1] It is, perhaps, not unfair to note that their many quotations from Roman Catholic literature are taken from pamphlets designed to discredit non-Roman Christians who, they say, owe their precious Sunday entirely to the Papacy! Saturday is indeed their Sabbath; and, apart from prayer and worship, is marked by what appears to be a prodigious giving—a genuine tithe of each member's total income. In fact, however, the sacrificial significance of this tithe is somewhat reduced by the strict rule against all forms of insurance, and the discouragement of giving to secular community charitable purposes.

If I seem to have given a disproportionate amount of space to the *Seventh Day Adventists* it is because I believe that they alone among the modern apocalyptic sects have any promise of a long-continued life. After all, they have survived for more than a century. After all, they have exhibited strengths which suggest that—with Protestant orthodoxy certainly on the wane and a rapidly growing secularism definitely humanistic—they will reap a rich harvest in the immediate future. While all of these new sects may make for the moment great gains among the religiously illiterate who are affected deeply by the terrors of the times, *Adventism* couples its evangelistic passion with a strong if often spurious scholarship. It can win a great cross-section of the social body. It may well be the future rival, in America, of the historic Church in the great contention for the souls of men.

The Church of the Four Square Gospel, depending as it did upon the amazing personality of Aimée Semple MacPherson, is no more a factor of consequence in American religious life. Her successors, in the promotion of what was essentially an old-fashioned Protestant evangelism of the Methodist type despite the bizarre setting of its services, have been unable to draw the mighty crowds of the old days or materially to extend the geographical spread of the sect. Of course, her popular ministry of healing is a characteristic of many of the new sects. *The Nazarenes*, and *The Church of God*—comparatively recent developments—practise healing through "the laying on of hands", "speak with tongues" in violent emotional upheavals, and generally imitate what they believe to be the practice of the early Church. These bodies, together with *The Church of the Pillar of Fire*, are all off-shoots of the Holiness Movement. While the *Plymouth Brethren* are sparsely scattered throughout this area, their rigidly puritan ethic is shared by the "Holiness" people of innumerable sects with no awareness of their origins, unless we are to accept their insistent claims that "the Bible and the Bible only" is

[1] Gibbons, *Faith of our Fathers*, p. iii. Quoted by *Why Seventh Day Adventists Observe the Bible Sabbath*, an official Adventist pamphlet.

the controlling source of their faith and practice. And so it is . . . interpreted by an abject literalism in which Moses, and even Samson(!), speak with the authority of a St Paul and a St John.

Certainly these "Holiness" and kindred sects share in common the old *Plymouth Brethren* immovable belief in the complete sanctification of the saved here and now. To accept Christ is to have won a redemption from which there can be no falling away, no lapse from grace, and no consciousness of post-conversion sin. But sins always are "of the flesh". Dancing and card-playing rank with adultery. The "post-conversion sinner" never was a true convert! He is an apostate doomed to eternal damnation in a flaming hell. Yet I have listened to a preacher of *The Pillar of Fire* body deliver one of the most lucidly orthodox doctrinal expositions of the nature of the Incarnation that I have ever heard. If there has been any recent change in the basic theology of the older "Holiness" sects, or in their teaching method, it is to be seen in their intoxication with apocalyptic ideas. The "prophetic" message of the *Adventists* has swept through the thinking of all these groups, and is leaving its mark upon many of the older orthodox Protestant bodies. In fact, much of their growth has been at the expense of traditional Protestantism, whose lay people are often captivated by the apparent logic of this reasoning from "the signs of the times". Now and then an Anglican is caught by this illusion of unity between the manipulated dates of contemporary catastrophe set in the framework of Scriptural apocalyptic passages, and Roman Catholic losses to this compelling crusade are far from infrequent. This last, of course, is understandable in the light of papal "fundamentalism". Romanists are half prepared for this sectarian "revelation" of the significance of Holy Writ.

Religious esoterica of a different sort is appearing all over the continent, particularly on the Pacific coast. Naturally, with so swiftly increasing a population—California is now the second state in numbers—Moslem mosques, Buddhist shrines, and Hindu temples, make an expected appearance. But the false *Yogi*, at least the heretic Hindu, finds a rich harvest among the religiously illiterate. Rich, ignorant women are his meat. So we find undefinable sects, each of them a fantastic mixture of Jewish, Christian, and Hindu ideas usually attached to a diet procurable only through the leader or his appointed agents. And, of course, the *Rosicrucians* flourish, as they create interest through an elaborate and costly advertising program in leading magazines and newspapers. Their publicity methods are subtly projected, and might well be imitated by the Church.

The question, "Why do these new sects flourish?", may, I think, be answered quite simply. Growth in population has occurred at so tremendous a pace that the older Churches have been quite unable to keep up with it. For example, the earlier settlers in the whole Pacific area were, in great part, pioneers and adventurers—gold-seekers in California—whose religious attachments were feeble indeed. They "multiplied and replenished the earth" with hosts of children who grew up in a complete paganism. At the same time there

was a drift away from those Protestant bodies which, like ourselves, were financially inhibited from the task of following the people with the Church. And Rome, despite its wealth and power, and the heroic missionary work of the Spanish Franciscans, was equally unable to cope with the flood of Italians, Spaniards, Sicilians, and French, who flooded the area. Some of these, of course, were devout Catholics; but very many of them were and are still violently anti-clerical. They came to the far west to escape the Church. To-day all of us are overwhelmed by a new rush to the west. Without their old familiar churches the believers among these people yearn for some ministry. And, fearful because of the uncertainties of the atomic era, the faithless multitudes turn readily to any evangelist who cries out in any tongue, "He who hath ears to hear, let him hear!" Certainly the soil is rich and warm for the planting if the right methods are used. Quite apart from the content of the faiths taught, these new and strange evangelisms do know what those techniques are and how to use them.

The Episcopal Church is advancing throughout this whole vast area. Much of this growth, however, represents no more than the transference of communicants from eastern to western parishes. Some of it—perhaps a disproportionately large part of it—is due to conversions from unbelief. But we have lost our greatest opportunity to evangelize the un-churched masses through a stubborn devotion to the fallacious conviction that the key to victory is in and through the universities. "Highbrowism" is our mode; and, despite the huge enrolments at the colleges—22,000 at the university next door to me—students represent but a tiny drop in the total population. When, through the labour of some chaplain, they do emerge as Christians from the colleges, they have neither the knowledge nor the speech with which to convert the industrial worker and the farm labourer. As for the clergy, until they learn how to evangelize with instruments other than Morning Prayer or "Sung Eucharist and Sermon", the local world cannot hear their voices. Presbyterians, Methodists, Congregationalists, and even Baptists, are pretty much in the same boat. They, too, have lost the art of catching the ears of the common people. This is indeed the day of the apocalyptic sects. But they will fail, as they must, when the tensions of the age ease and their appeal is lost. Then chaos; and out of chaos a new opportunity for the remnant of the historic Church.

Eric Montizambert.

Great Preachers—III. Calvin

The Reformation was not only an attack on sixteenth-century abuses in the Church, and not only a restatement of the New Testament Gospel; but, because it was a restatement of the New Testament Gospel, it was also necessarily a preaching movement; for it would be impossible to rediscover the New Testament Gospel without preaching it. Not to preach it would be a sure sign that we had

not discovered it. The Reformation was a preaching movement on as great a scale as that of the medieval Orders, or of the Wesleyan Revival. Despite their theological writings, their interminable controversies, their vast commentaries on the Scriptures, the reformers not only also found time to preach, but preached as if they had nothing else to do. They wore out their pulpit steps during the week as well as the customary twice a Sunday.

John Calvin was not behindhand in this work. The extent of his preaching is phenomenal when it is considered against the background of his other activities. From the time he returned to Geneva in 1541 until his death in 1564 he usually preached twice on Sundays and every day of every other week. Few of the sermons before 1549 have survived, as Calvin preached without manuscript or notes, merely relying on his memory for what he had carefully prepared. But in 1549 a French refugee in Geneva, Denis Raguenier, was paid by a band of fellow-refugees to take down all the sermons in shorthand. He afterwards made a fair copy in folio volumes (forty-eight in all!) which might be read on his permission. Thanks to Raguenier's care, we now have (despite the loss of many of the volumes) 872 sermons in print in the Corpus Reformatorum edition of Calvin's works, another 87 edited by Hanns Rückert in 1936, as well as 1,000 still in manuscript in the Bibliothèque Publique in Geneva. During these fifteen years he must have preached close on three thousand sermons—an average of four a week.

On Sundays he preached always on the New Testament with occasional excursions into the Psalms on Sunday afternoons. During the week he preached only on the Old Testament, except for Holy Week in 1562, when he expounded the Passion Narrative according to St Matthew. His method was simple. Disregarding (usually) the Church Year, he began at the beginning of a book and expounded it passage by passage, sometimes clause by clause, Sunday after Sunday, day after day, until he reached the end. He then began on another book. For example, on Sunday 25 August 1549, he began to preach on Acts. He continued every Sunday morning, with some gaps now and then for illness or for being away on business, until 18 March 1554. In that time he had preached 189 sermons. Or again, he began to preach on Job on Monday 26 February 1554 and preached 159 sermons until March 1555, when he started on Deuteronomy. This lasted until 15 June 1556 with 200 sermons. Straightway he was off again, this time on Isaiah with 342 sermons between 16 July 1556 and September 1559. If a native of Geneva between 1541 and 1564 did not know his Bible through and through, it certainly was not Calvin's fault. During the whole time he was at Geneva he must have preached on practically every book in the Bible. The theological significance of this method we will consider later.

It must not be supposed that the sermons are simply spoken commentaries. They differ from his commentaries in at least three important respects. First, although they deal with theological concepts, they do not deal with them academically like the commentaries. Calvin knows well how to take off his professor's gown and speak to

the unlettered. All his aim is to be understood. So he speaks in that beautifully clear and simple French of which he is a master. No rococo ornaments adorn his style. It is just compounded of precision, clarity, and force. Only, occasionally, an image will jump out, being the stronger for its loneliness. Secondly, because the sermons are not addressed to those who have some background of academic theology, they treat the points raised in the text at far greater length. Everything must be explained so carefully that even the dullest in the cathedral of S. Pierre may understand. And lastly, in the sermons Calvin applies the doctrine to the life of the people in a far more definite and thorough way than he does in the commentaries. Unless the Gospel impinges upon and enters into the life of the hearer, it is failing in its purpose. Calvin therefore always has a very definite aim in preaching: not merely to re-interpret the Scriptures in the thought forms and language of the sixteenth century, for this he does also in the commentaries; but to show his congregation—of some learned and a great many ignorant men, of artisans and shopkeepers, of some gentlemen and their ladies, of refugees like John Knox or Jewel of Salisbury, of schoolmasters and their boys—what relevance the particular Scripture had for their lives. For example, this from his favourite book, 2 Timothy ["As for me, I know I have profited, and do daily profit, more by this Epistle than by any other book of the Bible"]: "What must thou then do? Must thou rest thyself now, or bow down under thy burden? No, no: but thou must be so much the ready to finish thy course. Seeing God has set thee in the right way and set thee forward, beware now thou fail not. Thus must we practise this doctrine. But to make better profit of it, let us look at the matter briefly. 'Stir up the gift which is in thee.' The word that St Paul uses here cannot easily be put in one French word, unless we take the word *kindle*. For properly it signifies to lay the brands together and to kindle the fire. And this he says in a few words. He uses a similitude here, that if a fire that has but little wood is dying down, we heap the sticks together and blow it to make it burn. So St Paul's meaning is that we should take pains to stir up God's graces. . . . There are a thousand temptations to keep us back and hold us in this world; and they smother the fire. When a man is troubled with cares for the affairs of this world, he thinks not at all about the kingdom of God. Therefore, when the fire was kindled before, and there have been good flames and some heat, yet notwithstanding, this vanity that turns the wind away soon chokes the grace of God."[1] And so on.

Having looked at Calvin's own preaching and his style, we must go on to what is perhaps the most interesting and fruitful aspect—his concept of the nature of preaching. This is a part of his doctrine of the Word of God and therefore also of his doctrine of salvation.

Calvin uses *the Word of God* in three ways. First, the Son of God; secondly, the Holy Scriptures; thirdly, the preaching of the Gospel. As we are closely concerned only with the third of these, we need only say of the others that Jesus Christ is the eternal and substantial

[1] *Third Sermon upon the Second Epistle to Timothy.*

Word of God and, as such, the fountain of all forms of revelation, the source of the Word of God in its other two significations, and that the Scriptures are the Word of God in that they bear witness to the eternal Word made flesh and in that this witness is itself given by the Spirit of God and therefore in itself is divine testimony, the written Word of God about the Word made flesh.

Preaching itself is also the Word of God in just as definite and strict a sense. It is not another or lesser Word of God, for there is essentially but one Word, who remains eternally the same. When Calvin refers to preaching as the Word of God, therefore, he has in mind preaching in its relationship to that Word who was in the beginning with God, who was born of the Virgin Mary, crucified at Golgotha, and rose again in triumph; he has in mind preaching in its relationship to the written Word wherein the Spirit of Christ bears witness to the Word made flesh.

Preaching is the Word of God in a twofold sense. First, in so far as it faithfully delivers the Gospel handed down from the Apostles in the Scriptures. In other words, it is the Word of God if it says the same thing that the Bible says. The preacher is certainly not a free man. He is bound to the Scriptures. Preachers "must not put forward their own dreams and fancies, but must pass on faithfully without any additions what they have themselves received".[1] We now see the theological reason for Calvin's method of preaching. So closely does he regard himself bound by the Bible that he preaches patiently and carefully through book after book. The Scripture, which is the definitive and normative Gospel, dominates his preaching.

Secondly, preaching is the Word of God in so far as, when it delivers the Scriptural Gospel, the Holy Spirit himself takes part in the preaching and makes the human words into the Divine Word. "We see", Calvin says in a sermon on 2 Timothy, "how God works by the word which is preached to us; that it is not simply a voice which sounds in the air and then vanishes, but God adds to it the power of his Holy Spirit."[2] The voice heard is the voice of a man, but it is a voice that is the instrument of God and the vehicle of the Word. A man "preaches so that God may speak to us by the mouth of a man".[3]

In this way preaching fulfils its true purpose in the redemptive activity of God. Man's words have no saving force of themselves; they lack both *ἐξουσία* and *δύναμις*. Only the Word of God is powerful unto salvation. Given that preaching is the Word of God—i.e. that it delivers the Gospel handed down to it in the Bible and that the Finger of God touches it as he touched with creative power the Michaelangelo's Adam—then it is (with the Sacraments) a part, and a necessary part, of God's way of redemption. The perfect atonement of the Cross and the justification of the Resurrection are conveyed to the sinful man and realized between God and him in the preaching of the Church. Preaching brings to us, by the power of the

[1] *C.R.* liv., p. 8. [2] *C.R.* liv., p. 11. [3] *C.R.* liii, p. 266.

Holy Spirit, the benefits of the Passion and Resurrection of the Word made flesh.

Finally, let us see what emerges from this brief study of Calvin's preaching.

1. Preaching is *necessary*. Many activities of the Church could be scrapped without anyone being the poorer. But cessation of preaching would mean the erection of a barrier between Christ and the sinner. The Church would perish, for she lives by the Word of God. Fortunately, no Christian Church has ever contemplated this method of suicide.

2. Preaching stands *in the forefront* of the service of the Church. It is no less important than worship, prayer, and the loving care of the needy. The energy of the clergy should be put into this duty in a continual effort, not to preach "well", but to preach the Gospel of Christ. Where the sermon is depreciated, there the true life of the Church is sickly.

3. Preaching must always be bound to the Bible. We must preach from the Bible and say what the Bible says—of course, in the speech of to-day and in direct relation to our congregation.

4. Since preaching is a supernatural matter, we need to pray that God will make our human and lifeless words into his divine and creative Word, and that this Word may have free course in the Church. At the end of all preparation, we still stand empty, helpless, and with a mere human word upon our lips. We need, therefore, to pray: Come, Holy Ghost!

T. H. L. Parker.

A Political Note

Whether or not the opinion, "that there is no such thing as Christian politics",[1] presents perplexities to the theologian, it undoubtedly presents some to the political theorist. And by this I mean to the political theorist as such, as one attempting to operate in an independent province, and not to the man who happens to entertain at the same time an interest in political theory and the hopes and beliefs of a Christian. The anxieties of a man in the latter capacity will contain nothing of which the theologian will not take account. But the theologian is not obliged, nor indeed as such is he able, to pursue the implications of doctrine into a secular field. And so the political theorist may be able to add a note of marginal interest on an inessential extension of the theologian's field. That is all that is attempted here.

Without making a foray into Mr Auden's article at large, which may be treated for our purposes as a sort of theological hinterland, it may be advisable to quote a little more extensively. Mr Auden's view, which he presents as a reading of the text "Render unto Caesar", is "that there is no such thing as Christian politics, or a Christian art, or a Christian science, any more than there is a Chris-

[1] Theology, Vol. LIII, No. 366 (December 1950), p. 453.

tian diet". The conception of a Christian art and of a Christian science each presents its own difficulties, and we shall not be concerned with them. The comparison with *diet* is instructive. For one might have thought it very possible that there should be such a thing as a Christian diet, in the sense of a series of acts of eating; and one may recall that the term has been in use in the more general sense of a way of living or thinking. Mr Auden goes on: "There is only politics, or art, or science, which are natural activities concerned with the natural and historical man. The standards of efficacy, beauty, and truth, by which they are measured, are valid irrespective of faith, but the Christian layman is conscious of exercising his natural gifts in the presence of God." We will leave aside, as appropriate to the theologian, some doubts as to whether the latter half of the last sentence describes a consciousness specifically Christian, and exercise a dangerous surgery on the text to the extent of extracting, from Mr Auden's next paragraph, the words "what a layman should do is answerable in terms of his individual gifts and his particular historical situation".

There, as I read the article, we have an important clue to Mr Auden's view of politics, which may be abstruse but is certainly not peculiar. It represents an historical subjectivism. Within this doctrine, the injunction to love God and one's neighbour as one's self has no meaning. But it is not obedience to this injunction, in Mr Auden's view, which is, in his odd expression, "serious". What is serious is the intention of the will to love God and one's neighbour. Rightness hovers on the edge of action, but as it were succeeds in never alighting on it. So action remains completely "lay", an affair of particular gifts in an individual situation. The eternal and the absolute are in no way implicated. No wonder that, in listing certain preoccupations of the natural man—politics, art, science—Mr Auden paired with each of them a different standard by which it was to be measured. Thus science is to be measured by truth, art by beauty, and politics by efficacy. In this way it is hoped that none of them will be entangled in the net of the absolute. Without entering upon over-subtle speculations as to the nature of beauty, we may think truth the measure of science a dangerous criterion to introduce into this separatist world. It might accidentally get out of its compartment and measure something other than science. It might, in particular, suggest that "efficacy" is an inadequate criterion for politics.

Efficacy does, however, pair as neatly with politics as beauty with art. For as it is a tautology to say that a work of art is beautiful, so it is a tautology to say that politics involve a capacity to produce intended effects in a society. But whereas beauty is an end, either in itself or as part of a more complicated system of ends, efficacy is a technical expression and has to do merely with means. Politics, therefore, can only be understood in relation to something outside them. It is true that, the more precise our political studies become, the more apt we are to lose this something from view. For this reason some of the most profound minds engaged in political studies have been popularly regarded as cynics indifferent to ends. Machiavelli is

a case in point. But a mind as profound as Machiavelli's is perfectly aware of the limitations of its subject-matter, and does not forget the nature of its ends merely because it does not happen at the moment to treat of them. There is, however, a tradition of imperfect political philosophy which attempts to ignore ends so far as may be and to convert all to means. The various forms of historical relativism are in this tradition. None of them succeeds in practice in excluding ends, for the bent of the human mind is that way. But all succeed more or less—to use Mr Auden's phrase—in not taking ends seriously, in denaturing them by setting arbitrary limits to inquiries concerning them.

This is the classical fallacy of liberal democracy, which is nowhere more compendiously set out than in Locke's "Letter concerning Toleration". The "temporal good and outward prosperity of the society", says Locke, "is the sole reason of man's entering into society, and the only thing they seek and aim at". One is reminded of the aside, a little later in the "Letter", that "some enter into company for trade and profit, others for want of business have their clubs for claret". Locke could maintain his position only by producing the civil reasons for not tolerating atheists and sceptics. "Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all." These are but the misgivings of an innovator who, fearing he has gone too far, has not the courage to turn back. Locke's successors have dispensed with his misgivings, and their philosophy is no longer radically distinguishable from that of those whom they oppose. The answer to political questions "in terms of . . . individual gifts and . . . particular historical situation" is one man's guess which is as good as another's.

To Locke's indifferentism we must oppose Hooker's comprehensive system of laws which ties the most trivial action to the highest good. Then we shall not suppose that "God had ordained kings for no other purpose but only to fat up men like hogs". No doubt it is rash for a political society to claim to serve the spiritual interests of its members. It is fatal for it to aim at serving only their material interests. In this latter purpose it may succeed.

C. H. Sisson.

Studies in Texts

"We have this treasure in earthen vessels."—2 Cor. 4. 7.

The treasure to which St Paul refers is "The Light of the Gospel". Is there any other instance of putting a light in an earthen vessel than the story of Gideon (Judges 7. 16–20)? If St Paul is thinking of this, it will explain the foregoing verses: "If our Gospel is veiled it is veiled to those that are perishing" (verse 3). It was the Midianites who could not see the light of Israel's torches. "Light shall shine out of darkness" (verse 6) perfectly describes the smashing of the pitchers and the flashing of the torches.

The second half of verse 7 is compared in the R.V. margin to

God's words to Gideon: "Lest Israel vaunt themselves against me, saying, Mine own arm hath saved me" (Judges 7. 2). Verses 8 and 9 exactly depict the state of Israel before Gideon's victory, "pressed on every side, yet not straitened; perplexed, yet not unto despair; pursued yet not forsaken" (Judges 6. 4–6). It would seem that it is our mortality which is the earthen vessel; when that is shattered at the Resurrection the victory will be won: "Always bearing about in the body the dying of Jesus that the life also of Jesus may be manifested in our body. . . . Knowing that he that raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise up us also with Jesus". If this exegesis is correct, it would suggest that St Paul was using the Hebrew text, not the LXX, which has *ὕδρείας*, while he puts *ὀστρακίνοις σκεύεσιν*.

CLAUDE CHAVASSE.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Margaret Masterman (Mrs R. B. Braithwaite) is a Recognized Lecturer of the Faculty of Moral Science in the University of Cambridge.

The Rev. Eric Montizambert is Canon of Grace Cathedral, San Francisco, and Warden of the School of the Prophets. He is the author of *St Paul, Christianity and Crisis*, etc.

The Rev. T. H. L. Parker is Vicar of Brothertoft, Lincs. He is the author of *The Oracles of God: an Introduction to the Preaching of John Calvin.*

Mr C. H. Sisson is a civil servant.

The Rev. Claude Chavasse is Vicar of Kidlington, Oxford.

CORRESPONDENCE

"THE WORK AND WORDS OF JESUS"

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Dr Hunter has drawn attention to an inaccuracy in my review of his book *The Work and Words of Jesus.* What I think I intended to write was "some hundred and fifty citations of modern writers"; actual quotations from these authors amount to just over a hundred. What, however, I did write was "some hundred and fifty quotations from modern writers in a hundred and thirty pages of text" (not, as Dr Hunter quotes, "a hundred and fifty pages of text"). This is a gross error, and I regret any false impression which it may have conveyed. As to the rest of Dr Hunter's letter, I can only say that my intention was not to disparage his book but to criticize it, and that the criticisms were not intended to be captious. Whether they were ignorant and unfair I would prefer to leave to the judgment of your readers.

Yours truly,

C. F. EVANS.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE,
OXFORD.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Primer of Christianity. Oxford University Press. Each volume 6s. 6d. (School Edition 5s.).

Part I: *The Beginning of the Gospel.* By T. W. Manson.
Part II: *The Furtherance of the Gospel.* By R. W. Moore.
Part III: *The Truth of the Gospel.* By G. B. Caird.
Supplementary Volume: *Science, History, and Faith.* By Alan Richardson.

The inquiring adult, as well as the young person leaving school, is intended to profit by this series (see the dust-cover of the Supplementary Volume). It is to be hoped that neither will be put off by the textbook-like appearance of the volumes, by the title "Primer", or by the advertisement of a School Edition. For this series will disappoint neither category of reader, granted a background of good general education. Taken as a whole it is remarkably complete, considering the slight bulk of the books. Each book contains a wealth of sound and readable matter. The space is well used. There is no overlapping between the three parts. Where the Supplementary Volume overlaps with Part III the reader finds a different approach or complementary truth—e.g. in the use made of the O.T. Any adverse criticism is to be subordinated to what has already been said.

Four criteria may be applied to each volume: readable character, scope, clarity of presentation, and accuracy; all in relation to the extreme conciseness required in a series of this kind.

In Part I, the author's fresh translation of St Mark's Gospel is ruggedly readable, often arresting in its style. This forms the core of the work and yields most of its value. The same qualities are found in the translation of Luke 6. 20–49, interpolated (after Mark 1. 22, not 3. 19) as an example of Jesus' synagogue teaching, and in the glimpses of the Apostolic *Kerygma*, Petrine, Pauline, and Johannine, given in the Epilogue. This Epilogue extends the scope of the book in one direction as neatly and as helpfully as the short historical and theological Introduction extends it the other way. The 85 section headings, and a minimum of well-chosen running-commentary material, give a clarity which could hardly be excelled. The headings alone can be most illuminating (*vide* Mark 12). The commentary keeps before the reader the relevance of the Gospel to the present day (*vide* §§ 63–71, Mark 13). The criterion of accuracy applies mainly to the translation from the Greek; and this leaves little to be desired. Professor Manson is not afraid to paraphrase when necessary, and does so with success. There are a few daring but not too improbable textual judgments. Greek imperfects, participial clauses, and awkward conjunctions, are usually dealt with in masterly fashion, with variety of rendering. This improves style while maintaining accuracy. Not all pitfalls are avoided, however. And the author over-reaches himself at times. He is apt to out-Mark Mark, and not always in places where the Evangelist himself has been slangy or clumsy. Apart from this unevenness, the work as a whole

should fulfil its purpose excellently. The reader is left looking forward to the other volumes in the series.

Part II deserves special praise in that Mr Moore has made history readable to the non-historical mind, even if he has not the brilliance in this respect of Professor John Foster, who has covered similar groud more excitingly in still smaller compass in parts of his *World Church*. There are one or two tricks of style, not expected from an eminent headmaster; unnecessary pluperfects (p. 85, l. 22; p. 108, l. 7), plural predicates to singular subjects (p. 75, l. 28; p. 98, ll. 17–18), and occasional lapses such as "More than anything they were . . ." (p. 51, ll. 27–28). But these are not such as to mar the broad sweep of the writing. As regards scope, it is a pity that no account of Pentecost is given at the beginning, especially since that event is not included in the Epilogue to Part I. And one would have expected a more balanced treatment of the various parts of the Church as the story developed, instead of successive narrowings of interest first to the West and later to Britain: Prof. Foster's *World Church* would provide an antidote. Clarity of expression and description is well maintained. The author gives fine summaries—e.g. of portions of the story of "Acts", and of the course of the great controversies up to Pelagius (though conciseness here leads to an over-dogmatic tone). Quotations from Walter Pater and Dom Gregory Dix are nicely used to illustrate life in the early Church. A literary device of Dr C. A. Alington, based on Heb. 11, is adapted with good effect to describe modern pioneer missionary work. The fourth criterion, accuracy, must not be applied too severely in so short a work covering so large a field. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate (for example) that the priority of St Peter rather than St Paul in the converting of Gentiles is not made plain; and at the other end of the book, that no reference is made to the World's Student Christian Federation in connexion with the Ecumenical Movement. Several small inaccuracies cannot be detailed here. More seriously, the author does not seem to have understood the original meaning of the word "Protestant" (p. 100). In one place a list of "sects" is given which would confuse an uninstructed reader (p. 110, ll. 31–32). Various historical judgments would be challenged by some: the minimizing of the place of the clergy in the pre-Constantine Church; the principal cause given for the "*filioque*" addition; and more generally an over-generous estimate of the positive legacies of the different periods and movements in the Church's life, and the application of the soft pedal to their darker sides. Doctrinally, accuracy suffers from a leaning towards vagueness: examples could be given in relation to the Person of Christ, the Atonement, the Eucharist, and the Church. Perhaps in consequence a somewhat shallow view is taken of Christian Re-union. The general tendency is towards a moralistic view of Christianity, in spite of the author's explicit attempts to safeguard himself. But most of these criticisms are of small account in view of the skilful character of the history as a whole, with its noteworthy passages on the pagan background of early Christianity and on the second-century Church (the available

evidence is tidily pieced together), its enlightening descriptions of Slavonic Christianity and of the Iconoclastic controversy, and many illuminating comments throughout. The value of this volume is greatly enhanced by the bibliography given at the end.

Part III, which in one place links nicely on to Part II (*vide* Part III, Chapter III, § 1), is designed to show that the Christian faith provides an adequate philosophy and the power to rescue humanity. On the whole these purposes are fulfilled as well as may be in such a short space. The interests of clarity, accuracy (in the sense of sound philosophical penetration), and readability are happily served by Professor Caird's gift for making memorable pithy remarks. These are most frequent and suggestive in Chapter V on the problem of Evil. A few examples may be given from various parts of the book:

> "In dealing with facts you can be sure before you commit yourself, but in dealing with persons you must commit yourself before you can be sure." (P. 5.)
>
> "The thing that divides Christian and non-Christian scientists can hardly be the one thing they have in common—their scientific training." (P. 18.)
>
> "The theist has the difficult task of accounting for evil, but other people have the much harder task of explaining away the evil which we all know to be real." (P. 72.)

The author often gives illuminating and sometimes copious illustrations (cf. Chapter IX, § 1), of which many of the best are taken from the world of art. His quotations from poets and other writers are an attractive feature. A few arguments suffer from lack of illustration, however, as in the disposal of "intellectual theories of evil" (Chapter V, §1). This instance is the more unfortunate because Prof. Caird is usually at his best when disposing of the obstacles to belief (cf. Chapters II, III), even if he is somewhat dogmatic and "cavalier" at times. His positive exposition of the Faith (Chapters IV, VI–X) is valuable for many particular points and passages. Among these are his treatment of the Atonement, the emphasis laid on the need to define "God" and "man" by reference to Jesus Christ rather than the reverse, a helpful section on the fruits of the Spirit, and one on Trinitarian doctrine vis-à-vis popular Modalism. Well-balanced views are expressed on the Second Coming, on the social aspects of the Gospel, and on the place of the Church in the scheme of Redemption. Sensible remarks are made about marriage. It is regrettable that this volume, like Part II, exhibits certain deficiencies in doctrine. Such shortcomings, though they be less marked, are relatively more serious in a work of doctrinal character than in an historical book. Most happy and secure when expounding the doctrine of the Divine Word, Prof. Caird is less reliable elsewhere. It is misleading to speak of the ascended Christ as "accessible as an ever-present spirit" (small s) and as helping his followers "to win the *same* victory for themselves" (italics mine) (p. 3). To eliminate nature-miracle in the O.T. (p. 60) while upholding it in the N.T. (p. 98) is to confine unscripturally the work of Christ. Too strong a tendency is evinced towards an *apotheosis* or "deification" view of man's salvation by Christ (Is this perhaps induced by a fondness for the

Alexandrian Fathers?). On the other hand, the author fails to perceive the doctrinal, as distinct from evidential, value of the Empty Tomb in the traditional Catholic view of the glorified humanity of Christ (pp. 85–87). His attitude towards the traditional view of the Virgin Birth lacks understanding and patience (pp. 100–101). Too severe a judgment is passed on the Chalcedonian Definition (pp. 94–95). Metaphors used for the Holy Spirit are too much weighted on the impersonal side (Chapter VII, beginning and end). Likewise for the Trinity would not the Eastern analogy with human family life (i.e. the necessity of at least three for a complete love-relationship) be happier than Augustine's "amans, et quod amatur, et amor" (p. 118)? In his doctrine of Man Prof. Caird goes too far in redefining Original Sin (p. 78). He draws too hard a line between the states "under Law" and "under Grace" (Chapter IX). He fails to resolve the apparent discrepancy between man's need of "character" for the attainment of heaven and the possibility of death-bed forgiveness, and that between the urgency of preaching and the probability (which he posits) of universal salvation (Chapter VIII). And it is hard to see just how he can finally come down so heavily on the side of an eventual world-wide acknowledgment of Christ. Debts to the thought of Prof. H. Butterfield (p. 41, ll. 3–6) and Mr C. S. Lewis (p. 126, ll. 6 ff.) should perhaps have been acknowledged. Once again, however, none of these objections detracts very seriously from the value of the book, which should remove many stumbling-blocks from the inquirer's mind.

The Supplementary Volume ought to be read by all who have worked through Parts I–III. It might well be read twice, before and after the others, and several times over for its own sake. Dr Richardson's book is especially remarkable for the succinct comparisons which he makes between the Sciences, their methods and limitations (Chapter II). The distinctions between Human and Natural Sciences, Historical and Human, and Theological and Historical respectively, are made all the more patent and philosophically evident by a clear explanation of the differences between the several Natural Sciences. In spite of the author's own suggestion, all readers will be well advised to attempt Chapter II before proceeding further. In Chapter I, those who claim no religious experience will be disillusioned of the idea that therefore they have no knowledge of God. Chapters III–X provide a systematic Christian apologetic, starting—scientifically—from the evidence to hand—viz., the existence of the Church—taking the reader through the historical origins of the Church (Jesus and the Resurrection), across to the witness of the O.T., back to the N.T. (miracles as "signs" of the Messiah), on again to the Church as the people of the New Covenant (biblical theology, sacraments, the local congregation). There is lucid treatment of the nature of historical evidence. The author goes on to expound the doctrines of the Trinity and the Atonement (this order justifies itself in the text), Judgment and the Last Things, all in the masterly fashion we expect from Dr Richardson. The last chapter leads nicely into a plea for an act of faith in "the God who ever

draws us towards himself". Such a plea would be a fitting conclusion to any one of the four books here reviewed, since each in its own way gives account of the Divine Revelation and its fruits in such a manner as to bring the reader closer to his Maker, Redeemer, and Sanctifier.

JOHN C. SLADDEN.

ST AIDAN'S COLLEGE, BIRKENHEAD.

FROM JOSEPH TO JOSHUA. Biblical traditions in the light of archaeology. By H. H. Rowley. Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d.

The Schweich Trust, administered by the British Academy, was formed in 1907 with the object of furthering "research in the archaeology, art, history, languages, and literatures of Ancient Civilization with reference to Biblical study". Part of its income is set aside to provide "not less than three lectures to be delivered annually on some subject coming within the scope of the objects which the Trust is intended to promote". The three Schweich Lectures given in 1948 by Professor H. H. Rowley, together with a large amount of supplementary matter in numerous and extensive footnotes, make up the book now under review.

Professor Rowley takes up problems discussed, under the title *Israel's Settlement in Canaan*, by C. F. Burney in the Schweich Lectures for 1917, and, in the course of his three lectures, gives a comprehensive and tightly packed survey of what has been written about those problems since 1917 and of the different sources (Biblical traditions, surviving extra-Biblical texts, materials provided by the excavation of ancient sites) from which evidence bearing upon them has been derived. Professor Rowley makes it quite clear that much of this evidence is capable of more than one interpretation, and that the most that can be claimed for any reconstruction of the story of Israel's settlement in Canaan is a greater or less degree of probability. For his own reconstruction of the story he might justly claim that it rests upon a due consideration of all the evidence and of the opinions of his predecessors, that it is very fully documented, and that it treats Biblical traditions with more respect than they sometimes receive.

Lecture I, entitled "The Extra-Biblical Evidence", contains a detailed account of different inferences that have been drawn from such things as the name *Ḫabiru* given to certain invaders of Palestine who were troubling the writers of the Tell-el-Amarna letters; the name *Asaru* given to a people settled in Palestine in the days of Seti I; the mention of Israel as settled in Palestine in the days of Merneptah; the debris of ancient Jericho revealed by excavation.

In Lecture II, entitled "The Biblical Traditions", are collected and considered various passages in the Old Testament (narratives, chronological notes, genealogies, etc.) which have, or have been supposed to have, a bearing on such matters as the dating of various "Israelite" migrations (into Canaan, into Egypt, out of Egypt) and the identification of certain smaller groups whose private adventures came in time to be attributed to "all Israel".

Lecture III, entitled "Synthesis", contains further consideration of the evidence set out in Lectures I and II, a tentative reconstruction of the history to which it refers, and reasons for preferring this reconstruction to others previously suggested.

The three lectures are followed by a summary of dates which may serve as a guide to the reconstruction of history given in Lecture III; a list of "works consulted" which contain between seven and eight hundred separate items; and three indexes (subjects, authors, Scripture).

Professor Rowley's book would be easier reading if he had been less anxious to state fully and fairly all the views with which he disagrees; on the other hand, it would be less useful as a work of reference. His own reconstruction of Israel's early history contains interesting suggestions of which the following are examples: echoes of the *Ḫabiru* invasions mentioned in the Tell-el-Amarna letters may be heard in parts of the story of Jacob and in the story of an Israelite entry into Canaan from the south which, in the book of Numbers, is wrongly placed in the days of Moses; the Hebrews who entered Canaan from the south were accompanied by Kenites, from whom they learned the name, and gradually adopted the worship, of Yahweh; the story of Joseph as told in Genesis has "a substantial historical value" and contains hints which might point to Ikhnaton as the Pharaoh who raised him to eminence; "the Israelites who went into Egypt were part of those who entered Palestine in the Amarna age", including some who entered from the south and reached as far north as Shechem; Moses, born c. 1290 B.C., fled to Jethro (possibly a Kenite kinsman of his mother) c. 1260 B.C., led the Israelites out of Egypt (in the name of the Kenite God Yahweh, a name that would be strange to most of them) c. 1230 B.C.; some two years later Joshua led these same Israelites across the Jordan into central Palestine whence they presently re-established contact with kindred tribes long settled in Palestine, of whom those in the south were already worshippers of Yahweh and those in the north were not.

F. S. Marsh.

Selwyn College,
Cambridge.

Faith and Duty. By N. H. G. Robinson. Gollancz. 12s. 6d.

This book is a learned and stimulating plea by a theologian of the Church of Scotland for an integrated Christian philosophy of life by way of protest against the divorce of modern Protestant theology from moral philosophy. First comes an examination of Barth, Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr, who are all judged to have an unsatisfactory attitude to the fundamental assumptions of moral philosophy; then moral philosophers (special reference is made to Professor H. D. Lewis) are found to jeopardize insights of Christian faith. Finally, after noting the gallant failure of a theologian—Dr F. R. Tennant—to solve the problem, Dr Robinson proceeds to sketch his own solution.

But what is the problem? As a matter of fact, without a succinct statement of it by Professor John Baillie in his brief Introduction

(and perhaps also a recollection of Dr Robinson's valuable article in this journal of December 1948, of which the present book is an expansion) we should not be quite sure until we got to about page 85. True, the problem must naturally become clearer as the argument proceeds, but the construction of the book might have been better if we had been given parts of Chapter IV in place of the not very exciting initial observations on the trend of thought. The problem is twofold: If sin is universal because of the corruption of human nature, how can I be held morally responsible for my sin? And if all men stand in equal need of the grace of God, does not this imply that human nature is *totally* corrupt and that there is therefore no point of contact between the man and the revelation of God in Jesus Christ?

As Dr Robinson says, Barth is not really interested in the problem. He does not desire any comprehensive system of thought, for if the *imago Dei* is completely destroyed there is no *Anknüpfungspunkt*, and anything that natural man does is irrelevant to God's self-disclosure. But when the moralist affirms that at the bar of ethics the theological notion of the sinfulness of the race must stand discredited, is it not at least curious that so emphatic a denial could be regarded as "irrelevant"? This supercilious attitude to natural morality Dr Robinson deplores. He agrees with Dr Baillie that what God did for us in Christ is a miracle of grace, not of sheer omnipotence, and grace implies free acceptance. Brunner, though he deliberately raises the issue, is in the end equally unhelpful, for the natural morality he rejects turns out to be the *Kantian conception* of morality: and the notion of the autonomy of the moral law is natural man's final act of defiance of his Creator. There is now indeed a point of contact in man's conscience, but Brunner's distinction between a formal image which is unimpaired and its corrupt material content Dr Robinson thinks incredible.

In the third chapter there is a shrewd analysis of Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures. On page 81 a useful note distinguishes Niebuhr's conception of the uneasy conscience from Brunner's—useful because so often, e.g. by Dr Quick in his posthumous *The Gospel of the New World*, the two men have been thought to resemble each other in all essentials. Dr Robinson welcomes Niebuhr's rejection of the doctrine of total depravity, but cannot admit his distinction between the essential nature of man which remains unimpaired and the virtue of conformity to that nature which may be lost. ("Blindness of the eye does not remove the eye from the human anatomy", says Niebuhr. "The virtue and perfection are not something which is added to the structure as a coat of paint is added to a box", Robinson.) So much for the three contemporary theologians. Next in their turn the moralists are pronounced deficient, while last of all Dr F. R. Tennant's attempted reconciliation on Liberal Protestant lines is held to involve him in an unacceptable atomic view of human society. Dr Robinson himself suggests that we must, as Christians, believe that God was in Christ to reconcile us not on account of some accidental or contingent property of man, but on account of

the universality of sin. The legitimate objections of the moralists can, however, be met because the world is in fact a single collective enterprise of self-willed humanity, for which we must all assume responsibility.

This is certainly an important book which will be gratefully and widely studied. If *per impossibile* every ruri-decanal chapter was theologically minded enough to be drafting answers to the questionnaire in *Baptism Today*, and if in each chapter one or two clergymen had read this book, the Church's proclamation of the Gospel would gain much in clarity and conviction.

Hove. ——— Wilfrid Browning.

The Problem of Christ in the Twentieth Century, An Essay on the Incarnation. By W. R. Matthews. Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d.

If I were given to prophesying I should predict that this slender volume will prove to have been one of the most fruitful theological writings of our time, but that it will be many years before its fruits ripen and come to harvest. The Dean of St Paul's has every claim to be called a scholar, especially in the field of Christian philosophy, and his knowledge and power of clear thinking lie behind this essay at every point. But he is not, in these lectures, the Maurice lectures for 1949, concerned either to expound or to criticize a doctrine of the Incarnation. He has, as he says himself, every desire to accept for himself and to preach to others the values which the Christian tradition has always found implicit in the Gospel records, and he takes those values, realized in the experience of the first disciples and of Christians to-day, as his starting-point. And indeed, when we come to think of it, what other starting-point can there be? Having done that, and with a disarming disavowal of any desire to start a new heresy, he asks the questions which thoughtful men other than theologians are already asking, and which theologians sooner or later must ask too. He does not pretend to supply all the answers. Some of the questions are not yet ripe for answering. But he indicates with clarity and precision the direction in which the answers may some day be found.

The first of his questions is perhaps the only one that is ready, or almost ready, for an answer. The work of scholars on the Old and New Testaments, especially the latter, has gone so far that the broad outlines both of method and of result are beginning to stand out plainly. And it is beginning to be clear, despite the negations of such writers as Loisy or, in more orthodox vein, of Lightfoot, that we can, in the Synoptic tradition, get back very closely to the teaching and emphasis of Jesus himself. Surely it is time that more explicit use should be made of all this in our theological formulations, not by way of dismissing St Paul as a Hellenizer, and St John as a mystic, but by recognizing the organic growth in understanding and interpretation which the New Testament, as read in the light of modern critical knowledge, represents.

The second question grows in part out of the first and in part out of our modern philosophical distresses. The doctrines of the Church

were shaped in an age with a single dominant philosophical tradition. That was well, and those of us who know something of the later Platonism do not go far astray with the doctrines. But in fact the concordat of Chalcedon left more than one question completely unanswered, notably as to the use of the word Nature in speaking of both man and God, and as to the relationship of Will to Person. To-day the foundations of philosophy are under new and searching examination, with results by no means clear. What is clear is that the language in which the truths of Christianity have been clothed is itself involved in that examination. It is important to remember that the truth or value of our faith is not the language in which it is expressed. But it is almost equally important that we should be able to make ourselves understood, to ourselves as well as to others, in any more adequate modes of statement that may be developed. And yet it may be, despite modern logical analysis, that the concept of substance is more resistant than many recent philosophers seem to think.

The most exciting part of the book, covering a series of further questions, deals with the possibilities opened up for our understanding of human nature by modern psychological hypotheses of a fundamental common ground of humanity at the deep unconscious levels, and indeed by the whole conception of the libido and the unconscious motivation of action and even of thought. Clearly enough this cannot be left out of our account of the human nature in which Jesus made God plain to men. It is the great merit of the Dean's discussion that in asking the necessary questions here he looks all the time for possible positive contributions to our theology. Finally he does the same for Psychical Research, linking the suggestions derived from Jung's psychology with the proved certainties of telepathy and of experimental precognition, and once more asking the obvious questions, which some day theologians will have to answer.

Oxford. L. W. Grensted.

Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy. By Geoffrey Grimshaw Willis. S.P.C.K. 15s.

This "wearisome controversy", as Mr Willis himself calls it, was in its origins and in the details of its history a squalid affair. The Donatist leaders were insignificant men. Their strength lay in the support of humble folk, possibly of Punic or even Berber descent, in whom racial, social, and economic grievances against "transmarine" imperialist dominance found expression in religious fanaticism—though it must be confessed that this is to be inferred from the reported activities of the Circumcelliones, rather than attested from the documents which have come down to us, which are wholly occupied with theological and ecclesiastical considerations. The Donatist schism was purely "provincial", as its opponents never tired of insisting, and it might well have passed into oblivion had it not provoked Augustine to apply all the powers of his great mind to clarify the issues at stake, and so to develop Catholic ecclesiology. For this

reason the controversy retains its interest, and is not without relevance for a time when the ideas of "reunion" and "the sin of schism" so much occupy the theological mind. Mr Willis wisely leaves modern applications to be made by his readers. They will be all the more grateful for his objective and learned study, which will become the standard book on this subject.

The book is in two parts with a conclusion. The first part (Chapters I–III) tells in full detail and with ample documentation the story of the controversy from its beginning in 311 to its ostensible end in 411. Chapter III with its complete survey of Augustine's anti-Donatist works offers a most useful guide to students.

In the second part (Chapters IV–VI) Augustine's teaching with regard to the Church, the Ministration of the Sacraments, and the relations of Church and State, is discussed and compared with that of his predecessors, Cyprian and Optatus. Cyprian presented the most awkward problem. The Martyr-Bishop of Carthage was a high authority with both parties, but the Donatists claimed to be the genuine heirs of his teaching. They too were a Church of Martyrs, and they had to be met with a rationale of persecution. Cyprian had taught the nullity of Sacraments outwith the Church, and had countenanced withdrawal from the Sacraments of unworthy ministers. But the Synod of Arles had pronounced against Cyprian, and in any case Cyprian had not carried doctrinal divergence to the length of disrupting the Church, so bequeathing an example of Catholic charity. Moreover the Donatists, who claimed to be the true and therefore the only Church, recognized the baptism and orders of a dissident sect of their own which was disposed to return to the true fold. Finally the rigid view that only Sacraments within the true Church were to be accounted valid was modified by a distinction between validity and efficacy, according to which Donatist Baptism, e.g., is held to be valid but to become efficacious only by subsequent submission to the Catholic Church. With some qualms Mr Willis defends this distinction as less logical but more practically useful as a step to "reunion". He does not refer to the finding of the Edinburgh Conference on Faith and Order that the Sacraments of non-episcopal Churches might be efficacious though not technically valid.

In concluding Mr Willis offers an admirably just estimate of Augustine's ideals, ideas, and methods of controversy, stressing his pastoral earnestness, his sincere desire for unity, and his rhetorical flair. "The simplest mind would feel itself compelled by the exhaustiveness and repetition of the argument to consent to Saint Augustine." At the same time he notes that if simple minds "were to become susceptible to logical and charitable argument they must first be delivered from" the tyranny of their own leaders by the coercive power of the State! To this conclusion Augustine was driven reluctantly, and the picture he gives of the ecclesiastical condition of North Africa at least gives it some plausibility.

On one point only would the present reviewer join serious issue with Mr Willis. He says (p. 174): "With the introduction of the

thought of predestination the valuable distinction between a Visible and an Invisible Church becomes blurred." He is prepared to accept a "Platonic" distinction between the phenomenal Church on earth and the real Church Invisible in the heavens. But Augustine's distinction is not, as in Plotinus, between "Here" and "There" but between "Now" and an eschatological "Then"; and it derives from his profound sense of the Sovereignty of God *over* the Church, a sense of which Cyprian was devoid with disastrous consequences. The doctrine of predestination safeguards this essential truth.

University of Edinburgh. John H. S. Burleigh.

John Cassian: A Study in Primitive Monasticism. By W. O. Chadwick. Cambridge University Press. 15s.

English readers have a translation of Cassian's works, with excellent prolegomena, by E. C. S. Gibson, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. Mr Chadwick has added what was next wanted, a just and scholarly appraisement of the man, his teaching, and his influence. Of Cassian's importance Mr Chadwick will say that in his last decade he was second only to Augustine as a figure in Latin Christendom. It was the spiritual writings of Cassian, after they had been lived upon for more than a century, that formed the chief material lying ready for the practical and legislative ability of St Benedict, in his work of making Western monachism into the remarkable social and religious force which it became. Mr Chadwick does not idealize Cassian's spiritual doctrine. His basic ideas, he says, were Origenist, and came to him coloured by the contact he had with Evagrius Ponticus. Thus the reader comes to the delicate question whether Cassian's spirituality was mostly neo-Platonic or whether it flowed genuinely from discipleship of Jesus Christ. Mr Chadwick emphasizes Cassian's sanity and sincerity of aim, and defends him from the adverse conclusions that might be reached from an argument from silence. But he does not hide the fact that the ascetic movement in which Cassian was a leader had no tenderness for human society.

It has been observed how little the secular clergy of the fourth century thought to show up and correct the political faults of the Empire. Three centuries of persecution from the political order had perhaps driven Christians to a detachment from the life of the world that was not to be quickly unlearned. Cassian's ascetics certainly gave no thought to a crumbling civilization. They may have evolved a self-contained community-life that was capable of riding the barbarian flood like an ark, but not because they had been heeding the lowering political skies. Had the empire been in its heyday, they would have sought freedom from social environment no less, because that way lay the quest for the contemplation of God, which seemed to them so much more worth while than any ends that society was capable of pursuing. Such social relations as Providence makes inevitable appeared to the ascetic as ministering to the soul's progress in contemplation, or removing self-made obstacles from its way. They did not suggest any return from contemplation to help in

saving the world. Yet Cassian's monks were profound in their knowledge of Scripture and meditated the Gospels. With what realism did they meditate? Was everything that bore upon human society allegorized away? Mr Chadwick leads up to these questions—indeed he continually lays open issues arising from historical study as actualities for the reader—but dictates no answer.

Throughout his book his avoidance of overstatement and advocacy is fastidious. But if he leaves the reader to decide, the relevant information has always been mustered and the arguments of previous writers—commonly less impartial—have been examined with acuteness and learning. Mr Chadwick's own historical judgments are balanced and careful. Thus he distinguishes the *Conferences* from history. But the ascetics who figure in them are the actual men from whom Cassian learned. Yet, for example, it is transparent that not Chaeremon but Cassian was the person who engaged with Augustine, in the famous *Conference xiii*. Mr Chadwick, without partisanship, gives, in his fourth chapter, a sympathetic exposition of Cassian's doctrine of grace, generally and as under provocation from the Augustinians. On p. 128 there is a piquant poser for his adversaries, based by Cassian on 1 Kings 8. 18–19. Again he reviews Cassian's work against Nestorius, the *De Incarnatione*, and its bearing on our understanding of the spiritual writings. Of these last Mr Chadwick's estimate is, in the main, very favourable. The spiritual wisdom they distil was gathered along a road that led from "Scythia" to Bethlehem and so through the Egyptian desert to Constantinople, thence to Rome and finally Provence. It was a way beset with reverses and disappointments. And yet, though the blossoms whence it was culled were withered before it was laid up, the honey Cassian deposited in the new monastic hives of the West was sweet. It is a good point, that Mr Chadwick makes (p. 88), that some of the ethnic poison latent in Egyptian Origenism was strained off in the simple act of transferring the doctrine from its Greek context into a Latin culture.

Selwyn College,
Cambridge.

W. Telfer.

Retrospect of an Unimportant Life. Volume III (1939–46). By H. Hensley Henson. Oxford University Press. 25s.

The predominant impressions of this last volume of Bishop Hensley Henson's autobiography are of heroism and pathos. Heroism in the bishop's acceptance at the behest of Mr Winston Churchill of a residentiary canonry of Westminster abbey as a piece of war service, in the struggle against wartime conditions and physical infirmity; and also of a less public but not less real heroism in his taking charge during a protracted interregnum of the country parish to which he had retired. Pathos in the record of the endeavours of an active mind to hold out against the advancing threat of blindness, against the privations and solitude of wartime, and against the thousand minor ills that flesh is heir to. The reader cannot withhold admiration from the ageing prelate, whose mind is

as receptive and incisive as ever and whose pen as mordant and merciless in comments on individuals and movements. But the struggle was unequal as well as pathetic.

This does not mean that this third and final volume is not full of interesting matter; but it is very much of an epilogue, when the curtain has been rung down and the *dramatis personae* are being dispersed. Bishop Henson is still as interested as ever in the men he meets and the events of which he is now perforce a passive spectator; and fortunate are the prominent personalities who escape chastisement with the valour of his pen. But it is history (ecclesiastical and civil) from the wings, not from the centre-stage. As such it has a melancholy pathos of its own which neither the storms and tempests nor the victories and defeats of the two earlier volumes can parallel.

There is one further factor which should be mentioned. There is to the present reviewer something incongruous as well as pathetic in Bishop Henson's rearguard action to defend his orthodoxy of belief and Christian faith. Clearly his sensitiveness (always a marked feature of his character, and for which, it may be guessed, his superficial aggressiveness of manner was a protective camouflage) was wounded by the long suspicion of his fundamental orthodoxy, which had found public expression in the days of his ministry as priest and bishop. Yet surely after so long, active, and distinguished a career, with so many apologiae and books to his name (and many of them relating to one or other of the controversies in which he had been engaged, and setting forth the defence of his believed-self-consistency throughout), and after so golden an autumn as his Durham episcopate, Dr Henson might have concluded that it mattered little to him to be judged of man's judgment, as he drew nigh to the judgment-seat of God. But he thought otherwise; and perhaps his decision is not altogether to be regretted. For it bore fruit in the *Open Letter to a Young Padre*, which is at once a religious autobiography in miniature and a singularly moving *confessio fidei*. It is a fitting epilogue to this, and the preceding, volumes; and with its perusal the reader may take a contented farewell of the author, who passed before the publication of this third volume *ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem*.

NORMAN SYKES.

CAMBRIDGE.

A SOLOVYOV ANTHOLOGY. Edited by S. L. Frank. S.C.M. Press. 18s.

Here is a book which explodes the growing myth of the mediocrity of nineteenth-century thinking. It is a pithy selection from the writings of a Russian mystical theologian whose work is comparatively little known in English. In its pages we are given a revelation of a profound and adventurous mind dedicated to the central truths of the Gospel, dominated by an awareness of the historic Jesus, and striving to insert these truths into the confusion of a contemporary situation. Unlike so much theological writing, this book is alive. Solovyov had the rare gift of being able to express abstractions in lucid and concrete prose, and he wrote in the middle of a live situation and not in an ivory tower. The problem with which he is concerned he

states thus: "The Church is permanent and unchangeable independently of us, and at the same time it is built up by us, changeable and moving." This problem he expounds and explores under the headings: God and Man; The Church of Christ; Beauty and Love; Morality, Legal Justice, Politics. The exposition is stimulating. The exploration is exciting. But he does not solve the problem.

To read this book in England in 1951, with the tremendous issues in the conflict between East and West crowding our newspapers, our conferences, and our pulpits, is to step back out of a morass on to the last little bit of firm ground before the twentieth century, and obtain a wide, though personal, view of the meaning and purpose of the life of man. Many of the ideas are not new to us. But they are only familiar in the sense of things we are striving after, and not in the sense of things we have achieved. Church unity (and not merely the limited conception of Protestant unity); the true relationship between the divinity and authority of God and the dignity and ability of man; the emergence of a true nationality from the vicious grip of nationalism—these are given a mature expression in the book. And however familiar the ideas may be to us, the treatment of them here is anything but trite. Indeed, the value of the book lies in its stimulating and suggestive treatment of problems that perplex us to-day. There is no cut-and-dried solution (which is refreshing in an age of tailored remedies to suit all figures). There is only an invitation to seek, and a confidence that we shall find. Let us applaud that confidence, which we need badly. But let us beware how we seek.

Solovyov's way is not every man's way. He is that brilliant, dangerous type of dreamer who is so easily mistaken for a prophet. He has something to say, and it is eminently worth saying. But it is only valid within its own limited context. Solovyov is a free-lance. He has absorbed into himself centuries of thinking and believing, and stands upon this solid foundation with confidence and security. But it would be foolish to suppose that everyone else is likewise filled and secure. His doctrine of man is gracious and splendid, but only as it is tied into that background of the supreme authority of God in his creation, and only as it functions within a living and intimate relationship between God and man. Solovyov had all of this, and was able to explore and find his convictions strengthened as they came to grips with life. But in a world that has failed to discover this authority and this relationship, Solovyov's way can lead to desolation. And this has indeed been the experience of many thousands of people in our twentieth century. To read this book is to see what we might have been, and some of the reasons why we have failed so to be.

Stuart B. Jackman.
Barnstaple.

Christian Ethics. By R. C. Mortimer. Hutchinson's University Library. 7s. 6d.

The contents and scale of this book are puzzling. It contains eight chapters: The Bible and Ethics (14 pp.); Authority and Conscience

20 pp.); The Duty of Religion (15 pp.); The Duty of Obedience 15 pp.); Social Duties (15 pp.); Gambling (19 pp.); Sex and Marriage (19 pp.); The Sanctity of Human Life (15 pp.).

Dr Mortimer describes Christian ethics as being "the Christian understanding and statement of the one common law for all men", of which "Christians have a fuller and better knowledge" (p. 14); and "the content of Christian ethics is . . . determined by the nature of the divine revelation in Scripture" (p. 22). I wish he had more explicitly related that content to that revelation, and that he had discussed the modification of the moral field brought about by the resurrection of Jesus, and by each act of administration of Holy Baptism. There is a reference (p. 23) to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, but in the chapter on Authority and Conscience there is the assertion of the rule that "whenever there is serious doubt . . . there must be inquiry" (p. 35), but there is no discussion of the epistemology involved in Christian ethics. We are told we "are under a moral obligation to obey the Church", yet "conscience is always to be obeyed" (p. 25).

Man's first duty is to be religious (here follows a discussion on the duty of prayer, active membership of the Church and willing discharge of the discipline it imposes); and his next duty is to obey the law. This is stressed because "there is a prevailing temper of disobedience" (p. 60) in the nation, in the church, and in the home. But "the subject owes obedience to the commands of his superior only in so far as those commands are just" (p. 68), but "it is to be assumed . . . that the Government . . . only orders what is right" (p. 70). At least it cannot be said that here is any over-simplification of the issues!

Given then obedience "in the interests of stable human society" (p. 72), "all the remaining duties [are] different aspects of the duty to respect our neighbour's rights" (ibid.). These rights are "protected by the prohibitions of the Ten Commandments" (p. 73), and include ownership of private property, on which follows a considerable discussion. Chapters follow on Gambling, and Sex and Marriage, and the book ends with remarks on suicide, murder, war, and capital punishment.

To me this book lacks a starting-point; it lacks a connected argument; and it suggests a compilation of material already existing rather than a work planned as a unity. And it is difficult to see for whom it is written.

There is not much help given to the reader in discovering the nature of the Good and of the Right. The impression given by the frequent references to authority ("It is generally agreed" . . . "It is the general view" . . . "It is held by some people" . . . "the tradition forbids") is that of weakening any attempt to argue from the foundations. And the choice of special topics is as strange as is the scale of their treatment. Some discussion of the ethics of Sunday observance or of the closed shop might have been hoped for when one-eighth of the book is devoted to gambling. And the ethics of the use of contraceptives deserved fuller treatment than is given.

The index is both inadequate and revealing. There is no reference to Grace or Incarnation: none to Joy. There are three references to Richard Baxter: and one each to Captain Oates and Jesus Christ.

H. C. L. Heywood.

Southwell.

SHORTER NOTICES

Studies in Old Testament Prophecy. Ed. by H. H. Rowley. T. and T. Clark. 16s.

This important book, a volume of essays on Old Testament prophecy, is primarily for the specialist, though the serious student with some knowledge of Hebrew will learn much. The essays were presented to Professor T. H. Robinson by the Society for Old Testament Study on his sixty-fifth birthday in recognition of his work. The subject of prophecy was chosen as it is in this field that Professor Robinson's most original and most important work was done. A glance at the bibliography which is appended to the essays will make this clear. The contributors include Professor Robinson's own pupils, his colleagues, and some distinguished foreign scholars. Within the compass of a brief review it is impossible to do justice to this brilliant collection of essays, or even to draw attention to the salient points in each, yet all are worthy of careful and detailed study.

The contributions of Professor A. R. Johnson and Professor N. W. Porteus may be mentioned for special praise. Professor Johnson argues that the prayer in Jonah 2. 3–10 is analogous to certain other prayers in the Old Testament, and that the parallels in thought and language seem to be due to a common background in the ritual and mythology of the cultus. Ideas concerning "life" and "death" which are of profound importance for the understanding of the Bible are lucidly discussed. The theme of Professor Porteus's essay is that the basis of the ethical teaching of the prophets is intimately bound up with the Hebrew idea of *tora*, which is the concern not only of priests, but also of the wise men and the prophets.

Yet one cannot properly make comparisons, for Professor G. R. Driver's treatment of difficult words in the prophets and his suggested reconstructions is really a brilliant piece of work, as is Professor F. W. Albright's imposing array of evidence to prove that the Psalm of Habakkuk was originally a triumph song on the manner of the Canaanite epic poems of the early fourteenth century. But while one must not catalogue, Professor C. R. North's essay, the thesis of which is that the "former things" of Isaiah 41. 22 are to be sought within the oracles of the prophet himself, must not go unmentioned.

These essays were presented to Professor Robinson as a token of esteem; they are presented to students of the Old Testament generally, as Professor Rowley says, "in the hope that they may offer some

contribution to the understanding of the Old Testament prophets". It only remains to say that no serious student of the prophets can afford to neglect this book.

T. N. D. C. SALMON.

DUBLIN.

FATHER MICHAEL BROWNE, S.J. By Thomas Hurley, S.J. Clonmore and Reynolds. 12s. 6d.

Four biographies of Irish Jesuits have appeared in recent years and reveal what is admired by the order which exerts through its schools a great influence in Ireland. Two of the lives were concerned with Fr William Doyle's ambition for sanctity, which led to his heroic death when serving as chaplain with British forces in the 1914 war. The story of Fr John Sullivan had the interest of his "conversion" from his father's Protestantism to his mother's Roman Catholicism. Among his teachers was Fr Michael Browne, who became widely known in Ireland as a spiritual director and conductor of retreats. Fr Browne destroyed his own papers, so that his biography suffers from lack of material for its 242 pages. The tributes of those who knew him concur in dubbing him "Saint Michael", and give glimpses of his dealings with the schoolboys he taught and the novices he trained. The extracts from his letters, which were mainly to women, and the simple verses that he referred to as his jingles, reveal something of his pastoral methods. Though almost debarred by ill-health from entering the order in 1877, he served it for fifty-six years in spite of his great abstensiousness. Coming late to breakfast, he would be content with the crusts that had been left over and the dregs that lay in the slop-bowl. His mortification led him to refrain from viewing the Alpine scenery when he passed through it in the train. His devotion to the Virgin Mary was such that he ranked his reception into our Lady's Sodality with his first communion and his ordination to the priesthood.

The book is a homely tribute to a departed colleague, and might provide acceptable reading during convent meals. Those who seek to lift the veil which covers the life of religious orders will not find the character-sketches of Kate O'Brien's *Land of Spices*, the atmosphere of *I Leap over the Wall*, or the style which gives distinction to Fr Broderick's writings on other Jesuits.

MICHAEL FERRAR.

THE DIVINITY HOSTEL,
DUBLIN.

THE BOOKE OF COMMON PRAYER OF THE CHURCHE OF ENGLAND: Its making and revisions M.D.xlix–M.D.clxi set forth in eighty Illustrations with Introduction and Notes. By Edward C. Ratcliff. S.P.C.K. 10s.

THE AMERICAN BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER, ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT. By John Wallace Suter and George Julius Cleaveland. Oxford University Press. 10s. 6d.

The fourth centenary of the Prayer Book of 1549 added to the shelves of libraries, public and private, a handful of slim, excellent,

handsomely illustrated volumes: the third edition of Stanley Morison's *English Prayer Books, Notable Editions of the Prayer Book* by J. F. Gerrard, *The Scottish Book of Common Prayer 1929* by A. C. Don, *The State Prayers and other Variations in the Book of Common Prayer* by F. Streatfield, the S.P.C.K. brochure *Your Prayer Book,* and the two now under review. Turning them over, one's mind is back to those exhibitions in cathedrals and public places in 1949 when old editions were to be seen and handled, and learned men stood by to speak, lecture, chat, remark upon them. The whole thing in the archaeological and scholarly mode of the Church of England did much to enhance the prestige of the Prayer Book in the eyes, minds, and hearts of its potent and potential, constrained and casual users. Professor Ratcliff's is as a diamond in a set of sparklers, magnificent, clear, fascinatingly brilliant. The thirteen pages of introduction do not contain anything new, but are an epitome of superb accuracy. The many photographs of pages of old prayer books illustrate particular points and formulas perhaps of rather a specialized interest.

The American Book has more news in it for us in England. The frontispiece depicts a Prayer Book window dedicated on Whitsunday 1949 in Washington Cathedral—ingenious, if unlikely to trouble our island aesthetes with the pangs of envy. Chapter I is a chatty account of the history of the Prayer Book in America up to Independence. Chapter II is a scholarly résumé of what had happened already in the Englishing of the rites of the Church before 1549. There is nothing about the music already composed for English texts, nor is it pointed out that on account of the primers and this music the Canticles were already almost in their 1549 form. Chapter IV is on the revisions of the Prayer Book in America. It will be read with much interest in many quarters. There is too much of the nauseating "enrichment", so beloved by the puffers of 1928 in England: the glueyness of affective and imaginative devotion is not to all apparently desirable; a certain austerity in the public converse between God and man has still its advocates. The year 1892 added seasonal sentences to the penitential introduction to Morning and Evening Prayer, an initiative followed regrettably by other provinces this century. The American Book is also like other twentieth-century Anglican Prayer Books cluttered up with fal-lal invitatories fore and aft the *Venite.* The final chapter *ad fideles* is a powerful delineation of what participation in the regular and occasional offices of the Church can do with and for God's own possession, Christ's body, the living temple.

Robert P. Symonds.

Scholae Cancellarii Lincolniensis.

The Church and Music. By Erik Routley. Duckworth. 9s.

This book analyses church music from the standpoint of theology and metaphysics: a bold proposition, successfully achieved. The treatment is historical, from David and Pythagoras to Pius X and

Vaughan Williams, and every type of Christian music is discussed. There is much stimulating thought, and to interest the reader in Greek moralizings on music, or in St Augustine's metaphysical treatment of it, is something like a triumph.

The author writes as a "Free Churchman", for whom the Church is a body which has been invisible for the last 400 years, but only twice does he show unfamiliarity with Catholic usage; once in speaking of music from St Martial at Limoges as the "Martial school", and once in describing *Alma Redemptoris* as a prose antiphon from the Missal, whereas it is a hexametric stanza from the Antiphonale and is only called an antiphon by courtesy. With these two unimportant reservations the long and wide story of Christian music in its theological implications is well and accurately told: long, for 600 years of polyphonic development preceded the accession of Elizabeth; wide, as shown by many forms of religious music from sources unfamiliar to most of us, ranging from Abélard to Zwingli.

We welcome the statement (p. 107) that "the Edict (of Pope John XXII) had very little effect on Church music in general", a fact too often ignored and too seldom expressed. The interpretation of early seventeenth-century events (pp. 146–7) is excellent, and perhaps the most valuable conclusion in the volume: we read that the new music of that epoch failed as church music because it was "divorced from language and, not much later, from dance-forms. It had to do with no specific human activity." When Victorian church composers come under review we find Dykes is the villain of the piece. Sullivan rightly stands beside him in the dock, but we miss Barnby, and should be disposed to let Dykes off more lightly than the other two. Stainer needs closer appraisement and cannot be paired with Maunder and dismissed without due appreciation of the good work he did. For the twentieth century, we are told that "atonal church music is hardly to be found at all". This is, presumably, because it also has to do with no specific human activity: but we occasionally hear a suspicion of it from the organ.

Proof-errors are too numerous for a book otherwise so good. Footnote references need especial correction, as on p. 47, where footnote 1 (referred to in the text as 2) guides us to the wrong quotation in the appendix (24, p. 236, instead of 25, p. 237). Incidentally, this quotation from Isidore is often misunderstood; there was no definite writing down of music in his time, but allusions to notational accent-marks have been found by Anglès as far back as Quodvultdeus, a disciple of St Augustine (P.L., LI, 856).

Dom Anselm Hughes.

Nashdom Abbey.

The World Council of Churches: Building for the Future. Obtainable from 39, Doughty Street, London, W.C.1. 9d.

This illustrated pamphlet gives information in a popular form about the World Council of Churches and its various activities. It would be well if a copy were made available in every parish church.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ABINGDON-COKESBURY PRESS: Paul E. Johnson, *Christian Love* ($3.00); Gaston Foote (Ed.), *Communion Meditations* ($2.00).

EDGAR BACKUS (LEICESTER): T. C. Hunter Clare, *The Voice of Praise* (2s.).

BLACKWELL: Anthony Flew (Ed.), *Essays on Logic and Language* (16s.).

BURNS OATES: Aloysius Roche, *Apologetics for the Pulpit* [New edition: three volumes in one. See THEOLOGY, October, 1936, p. 255] (18s.); Joseph Duhr, S.J., *The Glorious Assumption of the Mother of God* (8s. 6d.).

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: G. R. Cragg, *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason* (12s. 6d.).

CANTERBURY PRESS: Brother Edward (Ed.), *Behold, Thy King Cometh!* (5s.).

CHURCH BOOK ROOM PRESS: J. C. Pollock, *Candidate for Truth* (5s.).

CHURCH LITERATURE ASSOCIATION: E. Allison Peers, *Way Up* (3s.).

CHURCH OF SOUTH INDIA (O.U.P.): *Order of Service for the Reception of Baptized Persons into Full Membership of the Church, commonly called Confirmation* (Annas 8).

JAMES CLARKE AND CO.: Ignaz Maybaum, *The Jewish Mission* (10s. 6d.); J. A. T. Robinson, *In the End, God* (6s.).

CLONMORE AND REYNOLDS: Bernard J. Kelly, C.S.Sp., *God, Man and Satan* (4s. 6d.).

EDINBURGH HOUSE PRESS: H. A. Wittenbach, *Communist China: What of the Church?* (9d.).

ÉDITIONS DU CERF: Yves M. J. Congar, *Vraie et Fausse Réforme dans l'Église* (950 frs.).

ÉDITIONS DU TEMPS PRÉSENT: Un Frère Joyeux, *Les Saints de tout le monde* (270 frs.).

EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE: A. E. J. Rawlinson, *Problems of Reunion* (9s.).

FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION: George M. Ll. Davies, *Pilgrimage of Peace* (5s.).

I.V.F.: Alan M. Stibbs, *Understanding God's Word* (2s. 6d.); O. Hallesby, *Why I am a Christian* (New edition) (6s.); O. Hallesby, *Conscience* (New edition) (6s..)

LUTTERWORTH PRESS: Marcus L. Loane, *Oxford and the Evangelical Succession* (15s.).

MARSHALL, MORGAN AND SCOTT: Oswald Chambers, *Conformed to His Image* (6s.).

MOWBRAYS: J. V. L. Casserley, *Man's Pain and God's Goodness* (2s. 6d.); Leslie Kingsbury, *On This Occasion* (Outline talks for use at the marriage ceremony) (n.p.).

PICKERING AND INGLIS: W. Graham Scroggie, *Psalms*, Volume One (12s. 6d.); F. F. Bruce, *The Books and the Parchments* (12s. 6d.).

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY: Emile Cailliet and John C. Blankenager, *Pascal's Short Life of Christ* (75 cents).

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION PRESS: M. D. R. Willink, *The Book of Acts* (3s.).

S.C.M. PRESS: John A. Allan, *The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians* (6s.); Gordon Rupp, *Luther's Progress to the Diet of Worms, 1521* (9s.); Oliver S. Tomkins, *The Church in the Purpose of God* (2s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: Hubert Northcott, C.R., *The Venture of Prayer* (14s. 6d.); E. F. Braley (Ed.), *Letters of Herbert Hensley Henson* (15s.); M. V. C. Jeffreys, *Light Unto My Path* (1s.); A. Cunningham, *William Cunningham* (12s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K./N.S.: H. G. G. Herklots, *Magnificent Heritage* (3s. 6d.).

VANDENHOECK UND RUPRECHT (GÖTTINGEN): H. J. Iwand, *Göttinger Predigt-Meditationen: Die altkirchlichen Episteln. 1. Advent bis Sonntag Invocavit* (n.p.).

Printed in Great Britain by
Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher